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Abstractor
Accomplice Testimony-People v. Gullick, 11
Cal. Rptr. 566 (1961). Defendants were convicted
of burglary and of assault with a deadly weapon.
On appeal from the judgments and from orders
denying their motions for a new trial, defendants
contended that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury that if it found witness to be an
accomplice, his testimony should be viewed with
distrust and would require corroboration to support
a conviction. The Supreme Court of California
reversed the judgments and orders, holding that
since the witness's testimony may have been
crucial, the trial court committed reversible error
in refusing to grant the requested instruction.
Although Justice Schauer agreed that the in-
struction should have been given, he dissented on
the ground that, the error was not prejudicial.
Appeal by the Government-Unitcd Slates v.
Koenig, 290 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1961). See Search
and Seizure, infra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Hair v. United
States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Defendants
Hair and Burroughs were convicted of house-
breaking and robbery, and defendant Burroughs
was convicted of rape. On appeal, defendants
contended that after denying defendant Hair's
pretrial motion to suppress. the trial court ad-
mitted evidence seized under an invalid search
warrant. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed and remanded the house-
breaking and robbery convictions but affirmed the
rape conviction, holding that a warrant to search
defendant Hair's home issued on the basis of
observations made by police officers during an
entry unlawful for failure to announce their
authority and intention to arrest him was invalid,
and consequently evidence seized under its
authority was inadmissible against defendant
Hair; that although one challenging the legality
of a search or seizure ordinarily must be the
victim of the alleged invasion of privacy, defendant
* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
Burroughs' housebreaking and robbery con-
victions would be reversed, since denial of defend-
ant Hair's motion to suppress was prejudicial to
defendant Burroughs inasmuch as the evidence was
essential to conviction and would not have been
available at the trial had the moiion been granted;
but that since the evidence complained of was not
a major aspect of the Government's proof of the
rape charge against defendant Burroughs, failure
to suppress was not so prejudicial as to warrant
reversal of his rape conviction.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Prirell,
12 Cal. Rptr. 874, 361 P.2d 602 (1961). Two
defendants were convicted respectively of burglary
and receiving stolen property. On appeal, they
contended that the trial court erred in admitting
over their objection evidence obtained as a result
of an unlawful search without a warrant. The
Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that
officers who observed defendants and a known
burglar going in and out of defendant's house and
saw the lights of the house go out as soon as they
knocked on the door and identified themselves
lacked probable cause for arrest without a warrant,
and consequently their ensuing, search was illegal.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People t'. Vegazo,
13 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant's
motion to set aside the information charging him
with unlawful possession of marijuana was sus-
tained by the Superior Court. On appeal by the
state, defendant contended that the marijuana
offered in evidence had been obtained by an
unlawful search and seizure. The District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that a telephoned "tip"
from an informer of unknown reliability that
defendant was smoking marijuana in informer's
apartment together with defendant's furtive
actions in rolling a cigarette into a ball when
officers were admitted to the apartment con-
stituted probable cause to arrest him, and cohse-
quently evidence obtained as a result of a reason-
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able search pursuant to the arrest was lawfully
seized.
Attempt-People v. Rojas, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1961). See Receiving Stolen Goods, ihifra.
Confessions-Cidombc ,'. Connecticut, 81 Sup.
Ct. 1860 (1961). Defendant's conviction of first
degree murder was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut. On certiorari, defendant
contended that oral and written confessions
admitted as evidence over his objection had been
extracted from him by police methods which
amounted to coercion. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that where defendant was
questioned repeatedly but intermittently during
the five days he remained in custody prior to his
confession, was denied counsel during this deten-
tion, was not brought before a magistrate with
reasonable promptness as required by state law,
was confronted pursuant to police arrangements by
his wife who urged him to confess, and was not
informed of his rights before he confessed, the
whole interrogation proceeding was an effective
instrument designed to extort from defendant
unwilling admissions of guilt; that in light of the
facts that defendant's mental age was approxi-
mately nine years and that he was suggestible and
subject to intimidation, his confessions were
coerced inasmuch as the procedure caused his
will to be overborne; and that the use of
coerced confessions at his trial deprived defendant
of due process of law. Announcing the judgment
of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
included a set of working principles to be applied
to coerced confession cases, derived from a
thorough analysis of the relevant case law and a
discussion of the proper place of effective police
interrogation in our accusatorial system.
Confessions-Reck v. Pate, 81 Sup. Ct. 1541
(1961). Denial of petitioner's application for writ
of habeas corpus to test the validity of his detention
pursuant to a 1936 Illinois conviction of murder
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. On certiorari, petitioner con-
tended that he was deprived of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law when the
trial court admitted confessions which he had been
coerced into making. The Supreme Court of the
United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Stewart, vacated and remanded with instructions
to allow the -itate, if it wished, to retry petitioner
within.a reasonable inie. holding that w'here
petitioner, a nineteen-year-old youth of subnormal
intelligence and devoid of experience with the
police, was subjected to repeated six or seven hour
stretches of constant interrogation during the
four davs of his incommunicado detention which
preceded the first of his two confessions, was
physically weakened from lack of adequate food,
and was in intense pain due to an undiagnosed
internal ailment, the total combination of the
circumstances which existed without interruption
through the time of his second confession was so
inherently coercive that petitioner's will must have
been overborne at the time he made each con-
fession; that in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, the fact that his first confession followed
confrontation with the confessions of his com-
panions had little independent significance; and
that since his confessions were coerced, petitioner
was being detained in violation of his federally
guaranteed right to due process and was entitled
to be freed from such detention. Justices Clark
and Whittaker dissented, stating that in their
opinion, confrontation with the confessions of his
confederates alone made petitioner speak.
Confessions-United States v. Killough, 193 F.
Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961). After being convicted of
manslaughter, defendant moved for judgment of
acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or for a new
trial. Defendant contended that since, his original
confession was inadmissible, having been made
during a period of unlawful detention in violation
of Federal Rule 5(a), his subsequent repetition of
the confession in absence of counsel was also
inadmissible, even though he was taken before a
committing magistrate prior to repetition. The
District Court denied defendant's motions, holding
that the proper test of admissibility of the subse-
quent reaffirmation of an originally inadmissible
confession is whether the reaffirmation occurred
after time for deliberate reflection and was in-
dependent of the original confession; that sufficient
time had elapsed between defendant's inadmissible
confession and his repetition thereof to render the
second independent of the first; and that while
consultation with counsel prior to repetition is a
factor in determining the necessary independence
of the second confession, lack of counsel alone
would not render defendants second confession
inadmissible. See also Confessions-Jackson -.
United States, 285 F.21 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
abstracted at 52 J. CRIM. L., C.&P.S. 295 (1961).
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Confessions-Bo/ger -. Unit:'d States, 189 F.
Supp. 237 tS.I). N.Y. 1960.. Plaintiff brought an
action against United States Customs agents and a
waterfront detective to enjoin them from testifying
in state criminal proceedings as to evidence and
statements obtained from plaintiff during a period
of illegal detention by defendants, and from pro-
ducing such evidence. The District Court granted
the requested relief, holding that since evidence
resulting from violation of Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure Iy federal agents is inadmissi-
ble in both state and federal criminal proceedings,
the District Court was obliged to enjoin the
Customs agents who had violated Federal Rule
5(a); and that although the waterfront detective
was not a federal agent. he too would be enj6ined
since he was present when Customs agents ques-
tioned plaintiff by virtue of information from the
Customs Service, a federal agency..
Contempt of Court-Rces v. United States, 193
F. Supp. 861, 864 (D. Md. 1961). See Juries, infra.
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor-
Statc v. Gonzales, 129 So.2d 796 (La. 1961). De-
fendant was convicted of contributing to the
delinquency of a female child. On appeal, he con-
tended that the minor was married at the time the
alleged sexual acts were committed and conse-
quently not a "child" within purview of the
statute. The Supreme Court of Louisiana annulled
and set aside the conviction and sentence, holding
that although the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in
Louisiana extends to all children under the age of
seventeen, including those emancipated by
marriage, the amendment which enlarged their
jurisdiction did not affect the criminal statute
under which defendant was convicted, and that the
word "child" as used therein did not include
married persons under the age of seventeen.
Double Jeopardy-Gori -. United States, 81
Sup. Ct. 1523 (1961). Defendant's conviction of
having knowingly received and possessed goods
stolen in interstate commerce was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On
certiorari, defendant contended that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on a
plea of former jeopardy. In an opinion written by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter. the Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that since a trial judge is under
a duty to exercise sound discretion to protect the
criminally accused and to see that justice is done,
a mistrial declared by the trial court of its own
motion in the sole interest of defendant but with-
out his express consent did not constitute former
jeopardy and was not a bar to his second trial.
Chief Justice Warren and Justice., Douglas, Black,
and Brennan dissented.
Due Process of Law-Powel '. Wiman, 287
F.2d 27i (5th Cir. 1961). Petitioner was convicted
of robbery by the State of Alabama. After the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus,
the United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded to the District Court ior a full hearing.
On appeal from a second adverse ruling, petitioner
contended that the state suppressed vital evidence
at his trial. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that where the state.had in its
possession prior written statements of an accom-
plice witness inconsistent with his testimony, and
knowledge of his history of insanity, petitioner's
trial was fundamentally unfair, since he could not
have been convicted without witness' testimony
and since the suppressed evidence was crucial to
the jury's consideration of witness' credibility.
Embezzlement-Stale v. Tauscher, 360 P.2d
764 (Ore. 1961). Defendant's demurrer to an
indictment for embezzlement was sustained by the
Circuit Court. On appeal by the state, defendant
contended that since only tangible proper3
capable of being technically possessed could be
embezzled, she did not commit the crime of
embezzlement by drawing checks on her principal's
account without authority and for her own pur-
poses. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed,
holding that although the principal's checking
account was in defendant's care, the checks were
intangible choses in action incapable of being
technically possessed either while in defendant's
possession or upon delivery and presentment to
the bank, and as such could not be the subject of
embezzlement.
Equal Protection of the Laws-Smith v. Bennett,
81 Sup. Ct. 895 (1961). See Habeas Corpus, htfra.
Felony-Murder--Cmnzonwealth t. Hart. 170
A.2d 850 (Pa. 1961). See Homicide, infra.
Habeas Corpus-Smith -'. Bennell, 81 Sup. Ct.
895 (1961). After petitioners were convicted of
breaking and entering, the Supreme Court of
19o11
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Iowa denied them leave to appeal from tihe [state]
District Court's refusal to docket their petitions
for writ of habeas corpus. On certiorari, the
indigent petitioners contended that in requiring
by statute the payment of a S4 filing fee before a
writ of habeas corpus will be docketed, the State of
Iowa had denied them equal protection of the laws
in contravention of their Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Speaking unanimously through Mr. Justice
Clark, the United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded, holding that the federal writ of
habeas corpus is the highest remedy in law for any
man imprisoned, and must be maintained unim-
paired and unsuspended; and that when an
equivalent right is granted by a state, "to interpose
any financial consideration between an indigent
prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state
right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner
the equal protection of the laws."
Habitual Criminals-People v. Denno, 172
N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of attempting to sell barcotics, and received a
sentence of from fifteen years to life imprisonment
as a third felony offender. On appeal from the
Appellate Division's ruling on his petition for writ
of habeas corpus seeking resentencing as a first
felony offender, defendant contended that not on
of his prior crimes, which were federal drug
convictions, would have constituted a felony had
it been committed in New York. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed the rulihg and remanded
defendant for resentencing as a first felony offender,
holding that a federal conviction entered on
defendant's plea of guilty to an information
charging the commission of several acts, some of
which would not have amounted to felonies had
they been committed in New York, was not a
prior felony for purposes of enhanced punishment,
even though the clerk in calling the case had
stated only that defendant was charged with an.
act which would have constituted a felony in
New York, since the crime to which defendant
pleaded guilty and of which he was convicted was
that described in the information. ".
Homicide-Commonwealth v. Hart, 170 A.2d
850 (Pa. 1961). Defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment upon conviction of first degree
murder. On appeal from the judgment and sen-
tence, he contended that in order for a killing
committed during the perpetration of a robbery to
amount to first degree murder under the felony-
murder rule, PA. STAT. tit. 18, §4701 (1945), the
intent to rob must have been formed before the
beginning of the fatal assault. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that so long as
the homicide occurred while defendant was per-
petrating a robbery. proof that the intent to rob
originated prior to the commission of the homicide
was not necessary to bring defendant's act within
the felony-murder rule. Justice Cohen dissented,
stating that since malice must be imputed to
defendant to raise his killing to first degree murder
under the rule, it was necessary to show that
malice [i.e. intent to commit the robbery] was
present at the time of the killing.
Homicide-Commonwealth -o. Root, 170 A.2d
310 (Pa. 1961). Defendant's conviction of involun-
tary manslaughter was affirmed by the Superior
Court. On allocatur, defendant contended that his
unlawful and reckless conduct, consisting of
accepting decedent's challenge to engage in an
automobile race which resulted in decedent's death
(when decedent crashed head-on into an oncoming
truck), was not a sufficiently direct cause of death
to constitute criminal homicide. Noting that the
case was one of first impression in Pennsylvania,
the Supreme Court reversed and granted defend-
ant's motion in arrest of judgment, holding that
while unlawful or reckless conduct is a necessary
element of the crime of involuntary manslaughter,
a second essential element is that such conduct be
the direct cause of death; and that although
defendant might be held liable in a civil action for
negligence, more direct causal connection than
that satisfying the tort liability concept of proxi-
mate cause is required to establish criminal
liability.
Insanity-United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d
751 (3rd Cir. 1961). Defendant was convicted of a
violationof the Dyer Act. On appeal, he contended
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
the issue of criminal responsibility in terms of the
M'Naghten rule, and that it should have grantedhis
request for an instruction based on the Durham for-
mula. Speaking through Chief Judge Biggs, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and
ordered a new trial, holding that in light of in-
creased scientific knowledge and of the basic aims
of criminal justice, the M'Naghten "right-and-
wrong" test is both archaic and unworkable; that
the Court of Appeals is free to adopt a new test of
criminal responsibility, since although the relevant
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United Stateb Supreme Court decisions appro-m
tile use of the M'VNaghlen test in federal courts,
none oi these compel its use or prohibit the use of
some other test; that the objectives to be fulfilled
by a proper test are (1) to allow expert witnesses
to present. the whole picture of an accused in
terms of his entire relevant symptomatology, and
(2) to verbalize the relationship between mental
disease and the concept of nens rea; that although
the Durhamt rule satisfies the first objective, its
"product" aspeft does not adequately fulfill the
second; and that these objectives are best satisfied
by the following test: A defendant is not criminally
responsible if the jury is satisfied that "at the time
of comnmitting the prohibited act the defendant,
as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law which lie is alleged to
have violated." Since Judge Hastie dissented on
other grounds, the new test, based on that of the
Model Penal Code, was unanimously accepted by
the court.
Insanity-Blocker v. United Slates, 288 F.2d
853 (D.C. Cir. 1961). After the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded his conviction of first
degree murder, defendant was retried and again
convicted. On appeal. he contended that the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury that the
defense had the burden of proving defendant's
insanity. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Edgerton, J.. reversed and remanded,
holding that the instruction constituted reversible
error even though it was preceded and followed by
instructions properly placing the burden on the
prosecution to establish that defendant was sane,
since under the circumstances it was impossible to
assume that all the jurors acted upon the correct
instructions. Concurring only in result, Judge
Burger stated that the "capacity for choice and
control" [i.e. free willi is the "basic postulate" of
the proper test for determining criminal responsi-
bility, and should be incorporated into the sub-
stance of the Durham rule and be fully explained
in jury instructions. Judge Burger mentioned the
Model Penal Code's rule (Model Penal Code
§4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)), as a possible
alternative to the present Durham rule. Judges
Miller and Bastian agreed with Judge Burger that
a change in the test for determining criminal
responsibility was necessary, but dissented on the
ground that this view did not require reversal of
defendant's conviction.
Insanity--O'Bene v. Ot'erholscr, 193 F. Supp.
652 (D.D.C. 1961). Petitioner applied for a writ of
habeas corpus for release from St. Elizabeth's
mental hospital, to w'hich the trial court committed
him according to statute when lie was found not
guilty of petit larcency by reason of insanity. He
contended that the superintendent was arbitrarily
and capriciously withholding a certificate, neces-
sary for his unconditional release, to the effect that
petitioner had recoe.ered his sanity and would not
be dangerous in the reasonable future by reason
of a mental disease or defect. In an opinion by
Judge Holtoff, the District Cburt sustained the
writ aid ordered petitioner's unconditional release,
holding that since he no longer suffered from a
mental disease or defect but possessed a sociopathic
[psychopathic] personality which might tend to
make him an habitual petty criminal, and since a
person with a sociopathic personality is not subject
to commitment in a civil proceeding, the super-
intendent's refusal to grant the certificate on the
ground that a month after petitioner entered the
hospital an "administrative policy change" caused
a sociopathic personality to be regarded as a
mental disease lacked rational basis and hence was
arbitrary and capricious.
Insanity-State v. Andrews, 357 P.2d 739 (Kan.
1960). Defendant was sentenced to death on three
counts of first degree murder for killing his mother,
father, and sister. On appeal, he contended that
the M'Naghlen rule, the test of criminal responsi-
bility under which he was found sane, should be
replaced in Kansas by the more enlightened
Durham rule. The Supreme Court of Kansas
affirmed, holding that since the broad scope of the
Durham rule could conceivably render virtually all
defendants criminally irresponsible, the M'Naghten
rule, by specifically defining that degree of mental
illness which relieves one of culpability, best
protects society and would be retained in Kansas.
Internal Revenue-James v. United Slates, 81
Sup. Ct. 1052 (1961). Defendant's conviction of
wilfully evading federal income taxes was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
On certiorari, defendant contended that funds
which he had embezzled did not constitute taxable
income within the scope of §22(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, inasmuch as Commissioner
v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), established that
funds are taxable only if the taxpayer has a claim
of right thereto. Overruling Commission'r v.
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Wilcox, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
with directions to dismiss the indictment, holding
that although defendant lacked any legal claim of
right to the embezzled funds and was under an
unconditional obligation to repay them, such
funds constituted a taxable gain since defendant
had complete dominion over the funds and had
their economic use and benefit; but that since
specific intent to wilfully evade federal income
taxes was necessary to support his conviction and
could not be proven inasmuch as the IVilcox case
was controlling at the time the alleged crime was
committed, defendant's conviction could not
stand. Concurring in the result only, Justices
Black, Douglas, and Whittaker stated that the
"claim of right" test adopted in Wilcox should
remain the proper test of taxability. Although
Justices Clark, Harlan, and Frankfurter agreed
that Wilcox should be overruled, Justice Clark
would affirm on the ground that defendant placed
no reliance on that case, and Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter would reverse and remand to adjudi-
cate the question of specific intent.
Juries-Ir-'in v. Dowd, 81 Sup. Ct. 1639 (1961).
Dismissal of petitioner's application for writ of
habeas corpus to test the validity of his Indiana
conviction of murder and sentence of death was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. On the Supreme Court's remand for a
decision on the merits, the Court of Appeals denied
the writ. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
the jury which tried and convicted him was not
impartial in 'accordance with constitutional re-
quirements. The United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, vacated and
remanded with instructions to allow the state to
retry petitioner within a reasonable time, holding
that although the due process clause does not re-
quire the states to provide trial by jury in criminal
cases, it does require that a state which does
provide trial by jury must provide an impartial
jury; that unless each member of a jury can set
aside his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of
the accused and render an impartial verdict based
solely on the evidence presented in court, that
jury is not sufficiently impartial to satisfy due
process; and that where eight members of the
jury stated, on voir dire, that they thought peti-
tioner was guilty, and some of them even stated
that it would take evidence to overcome their
belief, petitioner's conviction and sentence of a
crime which had been extensively reported prior
to the trial by newspapers, radio, and television
in a manner extremely adverse to petitioner could
not stand, since in light of the circumstances the
jury could not be found to meet constitutionally
required standards of impartiality. Noting that
such "anticipatory trial by newspapers instead of
trial in court before a jury" is unfortunately not
the exception to the rule. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in his concurring opinion stated that "this Court
has not yet decided that the fair administration of
criminal justice must be subordinated to another
safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom
of the press, properly conceived .... "
Juries-United Statcs v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433
(4th Cir. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
bank robbery. On appeal, he contended that the
verdict was coerced on the ground that the trial
court instructed the deadlocked jury with an
incorrect paraphrase of the "Allen charge." (See
Allen 2. United States. 164 U.S. 492 (1896)). The
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding
that the instruction reminding jurors of their
duty to agree but failing to admonish that no
juror should yield his conscientious conviction
was a one-sided, erroneous statement of the "Allen
charge" and was likely to have been coercive,
since the jurors in the minority might well have
construed it to require deferential surrender to
the majority view; and since the instruction was
immediately followed by the verdict of a previ-
ously hopelessly deadlocked jury, defendant was
entitled to a new trial.
Juries-Rees v. United States, 193 F. Supp.
861 (D. Md. 1961). (See also Search and Seizure-
United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md.
1961), infra.) After being found guilty of violating
18 U.S.C. §1201(a) and (b) by a jury not recom-
mending the death penalty, defendant moved for
a new trial or mistrial, or to set aside the verdict,
and to subpoena all members of the jury. He con-
tended that where a television program on which
nine of the twelve jurors reenacted their delibera-
tions had been video-taped after the verdict was
returned and was broadcast the night before the
court was to impose sentence, all without knowl-
edge of court or counsel until the broadcast, he
had been prejudiced in that the court might be
influenced by arguments in favor of capital punish-
ment; and that some jurors had discussed on
the program evidence not adduced at his trial.
The District Court, Thomsen, C.J., denied the
[Vol. ,52
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motions, holding that nothing sail on or in con-
nection with the telecast had influenced the court
An determining what sentence should be imposed;
and that the testimony of jurors cannot be used
to impeach their verdict where the facts sought
to be shown essentially adhere in the verdict
-raher than relate to the existence of extraneous
-influences.
Rces. r. United Sles. 193 F. Supp. 864 (D.
Md. 1001). After handing down the opinion dis-
cussed above, the court appointed two members
of the bar to study the matter and report their
opinion as to whether the acts of persons respon-
sible for the program amounted to contempt of
court. Accepting the contents of the report and
stating that such a program is against the public
interest. the District Court, Thoms6n, C.J., held
that .ince the applicable statute, (18 U.S.C.
§401) as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court, makes punishable only those acts affecting
the orderly conduct of a trial which are committed
in the presence of the court or so near as to disturb
order and decorum in the courtroom, the respon-
sible persons could not be held in contempt even
though the broadcast clearly interfered with the
orderly processes of justice. The court referred the
matter to the President of the Maryland State
Bar Association for consideration of whether
disciplinary proceedings should be irnstituted
against counsel for the television station, on whose
advice the program was broadcast.
Kidnapping-People v. Oleer, 12 Cal. Rptr.
865 (1961). Defendant was convicted of lewd
conduct with a child and of kidnapping. On ap-
peal, he contended that the trial court erred in
instructing that no specific intent or purpose was
essential to the crime of kidnapping under the
statute. (CAL. PE-. CODE §207 (1955)). The Su-
preme Court of California affirmed the conviction
for lewd conduct but reversed the kidnapping
judgment, holding that in many instances the
forcible transporting of a person incapable of
giving consent because of infancy or mental con-
dition may be entirely innocent, and the legisla-
ture could not have intended the statute to apply
to such cases; and consequently that while for-
cible moving without specific intent constitutes
the crime of kidnapping if the victim is conscious
and capable of giving consent, specific criminal
intent must be proved where the victim is un-
conscious or incapahle in law of giving consent.
Lie Detector Evidence-MVatto- ,-. Stalc, 128
So.2d 368 ('Miss. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of murder. On appeal, he contended that the trial
court erred in admitting as evidence testimony
tending to establish the fact that the state's
key witness had taken a lie detector test. The
'Supreme Court of 'Mississippi reversed and re-
manded. holding that knowledge of the fact that
a witness has taken a lie detector test may tend
unduly to increase the jury's4 e~timatiou of'his
credibility, and that. consequently. facts tending
to prove the taking of such a test, as well as its
results, are inadmissible.
Obscenity-farcis v. Search W1-arrants, 81
Sup. Ct. 1709 (1961). Condemnation of all copies
of 100 publications owned by defendant purveyors
was affirmed by the Supreme, Court of Missouri.
On appeal, defendants contended that Missouri's
procedures authorizing the search for and seizure
of allegedly, obscene publications operated to
deprive defendants of the right to legitimate ex-
pression guaranteed them by the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Mo. REV. STAT. §§542.380(2),
542.400-420 (1949); Mo. RULES 33.01). Speaking
'through 1\Ir. Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that ,"under the
Fourteenth Amendment a State, is not free to
adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing
with obscenity ... without regard to the possible
consequences for constitutionally protected
speech," and that operation of procedures [in-
cluding provisions whereby warrants for the seizure
of "obscene publications" could be, and in this
case were, issued on the assertions of a single
officer without scrutiny of the allegedly obscene
materials by the judgel which resulted in the
condemnation of 100 publications but permitted
the seizure of and suppression from the market
for over two months of all copies of 180 publica-
tions belonging to defendants which were eventu-
alh- found not to be obscene "lacked the safeguards
which due process demands to assure nonob-
scene material the constitutional protection to
which it is entitled. ... " Not reaching the issue
decided by a majority of the Court, Justices
Black and Douglas concurred on the ground that
the seizure was effected by execution of a general
warrant failing to describe specifically the things
to be seized, in violation of the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
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Prejudicial Remarks by Prosecutor-Pcnning-
ton 2. State, 345 S.W.2d 527 (Crim. App. Tex.
1961). Defendant was convicted of robbery by
assault. On appeal, he contended that the trial
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury not
to consider the following statement made by the
district attorney in his closing argument: "The
people of Nueces County expect you to put this
man away." The Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed and remanded, holding that the remark
was clearly improper inasmuch as its effect was to
ask for a conviction upon public sentiment rather
than upon the evidence, and that it prejudiced
defendant to the extent that the trial court's
denial of his request to instruct the jury-to disre-
gard it was reversible error.
Receiving Stolen Goods-People v. Rojas, 10
Cal. Rptr. 465 (1961). Defendants were convicted
of receiving stolen goods. On appeal, they con-
tended that they could not have committed the
substantive offense, since the goods had been re-
covered by state officers before being received by
defendants. The Supreme Court of California
reversed and remanded with directions to enter
judgment or probation order, as the court below
should decide, for the crime of attempting to receive
stolen goods, holding that although commission
of the substantive offense was impossible in law,
since the goods ceased to be "stolen" when re-
covered by officers, defendants nonetheless were
guilty of attempting to receive stolen goods, since
they had specific intent to commit the substantive
offense and did those acts which they reasonably
believed were necessary to consummate it.
Res Judicata-Unied States v. Kramcr, 289
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of conspiring to burglarize United States post
offices and to receive stolen goods, and of the sub-
stantive offense of receiving stolen goods. On
appeal, he contended that admission of evidence
tending to prove his participation in burglaries
of which he had been acquitted at a prior trial was
error under the principle of collateral estoppel
[res judicata]. The Court of Appeals, Friendly,
J., reversed with directions to enter judgment of
acquittal on two counts charging conspiracy to
burglarize, and reversed and remanded the con-
victions of receiving and conspiracy to receive
with directions to exclude all evidence showing
defendant to be a principal or an aider and abetter
in the burglaries, holding that in light of the record
of his first trial, the verdict of "not guilty" ol the
substantive burglary offenses conclusively de-
termined that defendant was not responsible for
the burglaries, and hence introduction of such
evidence at a subsequent trial for other offenses
arising from the same transaction was reversible
error, since although the Government may "charge
an acquitted defendant with other crimes claimed
to arise from the same or related conduct... it
may not prove the new charge by asserting facts
necessarily determined against it on the first
trial..."; that although in theory an acquittal of
the substantive charges was not inconsistent with
conviction of conspiracy to burglarize, "the core
of the prosecutor's case was in each case the same"
(citing Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575
(1948), and noting that the instant case is its
converse), and consequently the court would direct
judgments of acquittal on those counts; but since
evidence other than that barred by collateral
estoppel sufficed for submission to a jury of the
counts charging receiving and conspiracy to receive
stolen goods, those counts would be reversed and
remanded with directions to exclude at the new
trial the evidence complained of.
Right to Counsel-People v. Waterman, 175
N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1961). Defendants' convictions
of first degree robbery, second degree larceny, and
assault were reversed on the law by the Appellate
Division. On appeal by the state, defendants con-
tended that the trial court erred in admitting
incriminating statements made. by defendant
Waterman during post-indictment interrogation
in absence of counsel and without having been
informed of his rights. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that although a defendant need
not be informed of his rights prior to indictment,
admission of the post-indictment statements
made by defendant Waterman was reversible
error where he was not first advised of his right
to counsel, since this right accrues when the
criminal cause begins [i.e., upon indictment]; and
that erroneous admission of defendant Waterman's
confession, which implicated defendant Devine,
warranted reversal of defendant Devine's con-
viction in the interest of justice. The court noted
that denial of counsel after indictment and before
trial may well be more damaging than denial
during the trial itself. Compare People v. Noble,
Self-Incrimination, infra.
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Search and Seizure-United States v. Koenig,
290 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1961). Defendant's pre-
indictment motion to suppress was granted by
the District Court. On appeal by the United
States, defendant contended that the order was
not appealable. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that defendant's motion made after a
complaint and commitment hearing but before
indictment was an early stage of the criminal case
against him; and since an order to suppress evi-
dence is appealable only if the motion to suppress
was made in an independent civil proceeding, the
United States could not appeal from the order.
Search and Seizure-United States v. Recs,
193 F. Supp. 849 (D. 'Md. 1961). Defendant was
convicted of interstate transportation of a kid-
napped woman for the purpose of sexual gratifica-
tion and beating and killiiig her, and of interstate
transportation of the woman's kidnapped child
for the purpose of beating and killing her and
avoiding detection. On alternative motions for
judgment of acquittal or for a new trial, defendant
contended that evidence was illegally seized from
his parents' home and hence should not have been
admitted at the trial. The District Court denied
both motions, holding that a revolver was admis-
sible since it was an instrument of the crime which
the officers were investigating and since it was
found in defendant's parents' home, no part of
which was reserved for defendant's exclusive use,
during a search authorized by the parents; and
that although seizure during the same search of
obscene papers which were not admitted at the
Trial was illegal in light of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments considered together, since they were
neither instruments nor fruits of the crime and
had not been abandoned by defendant, the obscene
material would not be returned to him since it
contained an autobiographical account of the
crimes which might be admissible in subsequent
proceedings arising therefrom.
Search and Seizure-Aday r. Superior Court,
13 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961). Petitioners' application
for writ of mandamus to compel return of prop-
ertv seized under an allegedly invalid search
warrant in connection with an obscenity charge
was denied by the District Court of Appeal. On
appeal, petitioners contended that the warrant
was invalid because it did not particularly describe
all the things to be seized. The Supreme Court
of California issued a peremptory writ directing
the return of all property seized under the warrant
with the exception of two books, holding that
except for specific references to these books, the
description in the warrant consisted of a list of
broad, general categories not sufficiently specific
to satisfy California's constitutional requirement,
but that the warrant was severable and not invalid
with respect to the specified iterms.
Search and Seizure -People v. Bly, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 542 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant was
convicted of -conspiring to commit forgery and of
forgery of fictitious names. Oii appeal, he con-
tended that his conviction was based on evidence
obtained as the result of an illegal search. The
District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
inasmuch as bundles of checks found in a trash
can had been discarded, they could not be the
object of an illegal search and seizure, and that
similar bundles found on defendant's front stoop
and in bushes near his house were not obtained
by any kind of search, since they were in open view
and not within the house.
Search and Seizure-Marcus v. Search War-
rants, 81 Sup. Ct. 1709 (1961). See Obscenity,
supra.
Self-Incrimination.--People v. Noble, 175 N.E.2d
451 (N.Y. 1961). Defendants Barber and Noble
were convicted of first degree murder. On appeal,
they contended that defendant Noble's written
confession, necessary to support both convictions,
was obtained in violation of his privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that although mere failure
to warn a defendant of his rights during police
investigation prior to indictment is not error, the
Assistant District Attorney's flat refusal to answer
defendant Noble when the latter asked whether
he had to speak before consulting counsel, violated
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination,
since it could reasonably have led defendant to
believe that he was compelled to answer; that the
use at defendant Noble's trial of the confession
thus procured "violated the fundamental fairness
essential to the concept of justice"; and that in
the interest of justice, defendant Barber's judg-
ment of conviction would also be reversed and
remanded.
Self-Incrimination-Johns v. State, 109 N.W.2d
490 (Wis. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
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armed robbery and first degree murder. On appeal,
he contended that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that defendant's failure to
testify raised no presumption against him. Noting
that the case was one of first impression in Wis-
consin, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
although a statute provides that failure to testify
in his own behalf creates no presumption against
a defendant, the trial court was under no duty
to so instruct in the absence of a request by de-
fendant.
Sodomy-People v. Randall, 174 N.E.2d 507
(N.Y. 1961). Defendant's conviction of attempted
sodomy in the second degree, a felony, was reduced
by the Appellate Division to attempted sodomy
as a misdemeanor. On cross appeals, defendant
contended that since the statute (N.Y. PEN.
LAWS §15 (1950)) does not apply to the passive
party to an act of sodomy, he committed no crime
when he allowed an infant to attempt voluntarily
to perform an act of anal intercourse with him.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
although defendant as a passive party to the act
was guilty of no crime described by the sodomy
statute, he was a principal to the crime of attempt-
ing to commit sodomy as a misdemeanor since he
aided and abetted his active partner, whose act
amounted to that crime.
Speedy Trial-United Stales v. Lane, 193 F.
Supp. 395 (N.D. Ind. 1961). Petitioners were
convicted of first degree murder in 1936, and in
1954 were convicted of second degree murder at a
second trial held after their motion for new trial
was granted in 1953. On petition for writ of habeas
corpus, petitioners contended that by deliberately
preventing them from obtaining a timely appellate
review of their original conviction, and by retrying
them for the same offense nearly eighteen years
later, the State of Indiana denied petitioners a
speedy trial in violation of their federal Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Noting that the petition
presented an unprecedented issue, the District
Court granted the writ and ordered that petitioners
be discharged and released from custody, holding
that their failure to seek habeas corpus in a federal
court until now did not prejudice petitioners in
this action; and that since Indiana State Prison
officials prevented petitioners from mailing letters
necessary to effect a timely appeal of their original
sentence, and since no procedural method for ob-
taining belated appellate review existed until a
state court decision -in 1948, Indiana deprived
petitioners of their right to both a speedy and fair
trial in violation of the Indiana constitution and
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it retried them in 1954.
Wiretapping-Pugach v. Klein. 193 F. Supp.
630 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). Petitioner, a state prisoner
awaiting trial, applied for a writ of mandamus to
compel the United States Attorney to prosecute a
New York City policeman, an Assistant District
Attorney, and a County Judge for alleged viola-
tions of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
for a writ of habeas corpus, and for warrants for
the arrest of the three aforementioned persons.
Petitioner contended that these persons violated
and conspired to violate §605 of the Act, (47 U.S.C.
§605 (1934)), and that evidence obtained by such
violation and conspiracy was to be used at his
impending trial. The District Court denied all
-applications, holding that it refused to interfere
in a preliminary stage of a state criminal prosecu-
tion, since the information gained as a result of the
wiretapping was admissible in the proceeding under
New York law consistent with petitioner's federal
right to due process, and since any other course
of action by the District Court would embarrass.
impede, and obstruct the state criminal proceeding
in a manner repugnant to our system of dual
sovereignty.
Witnesses-People v. Gullick. 11 Cal. Rptr.
566 (1961). See Accomplice Testimony, supra.
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